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IN OR OUT: CALCULATION OF THE 
MEDICAL LOSS RATIO AND ITS EFFECT 
ON THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Abstract: On March 18, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held, in Morris v. California Physicians’ Service, that when cal-
culating the Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) provision of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), there is no distinction between services from in-
network or out-of-network providers. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the numerator of the MLR may include out-of-network services as part the in-
surance company’s incurred claims. The Ninth Circuit was the first to interpret 
the MLR provision and address whether there was any basis in the language or 
spirit of the ACA to narrowly read the MLR provision. This Comment argues 
that the Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation properly promotes the core values 
behind the enactment of the ACA. 
INTRODUCTION 
Enacted in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
has the principal objectives of increasing the American population’s health 
insurance coverage and decreasing health care costs.1 In Morris v. California 
Physicians’ Service, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
considered these two core values when, in a 2019 case of first impression, it 
interpreted the parameters of the Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) provision.2 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18122 (2018); Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012). On March 23, 2010, President Obama 
signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which is often regarded as one 
of the most influential pieces of health-care legislation since the formation of Medicare and Medicaid. 
Scott E. Harrington, U.S. Health-Care Reform: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 J. 
RISK & INS. 703, 703 (2010). 
 2 See Morris v. Cal. Physicians’ Serv., 918 F.3d 1011, 1012, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2019) (stating that 
the Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) provision further promotes the core values of the ACA and incentiviz-
es insurance companies to focus their spending on clinical services). Clinical services include profes-
sional services provided in outpatient clinics, establishments owned by a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) 
or Doctor of Osteopathy (D.O.), or certain medical or diagnostic laboratories that can independently 
bill. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE ACCOUNTS: 
METHODOLOGY PAPER, 2017, at 10 (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/dsm-17.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YEP6-68ZN]. Clinical services also include those provided by an M.D. or D.O in a hospital 
and are considered to be part of the hospital services estimate. Id. Examples of clinical services in-
clude emergency care, mental health services, pediatric care, and surgery and anesthesia. Clinical 
Services, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/hospitals/clincial-services/en/ [https://
perma.cc/MJ3M-PDLF].  
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Congress implemented the MLR provision with the purpose of lowering 
of health care costs by requiring insurance companies to provide clear ac-
counting of these costs and ensuring that insurance enrollees receive value 
for their premium payments.3 The MLR provision requires that eighty-
percent of an insurance company’s spending go towards clinical services and 
health care quality improvement.4 If an insurance company fails to meet this 
threshold, it must send its policyholders a rebate of the difference between 
the amount it spent on clinical services and the eighty-percent value.5 
As the MLR is a ratio, its calculation involves a numerator and a de-
nominator.6 The numerator consists of the amount an insurer spent on in-
curred claims plus the amount it spent on activities improving health care 
                                                                                                                           
 3 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 (2018). The ACA gives the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) direct enforcement authority for the MLR provision. Id. § 300gg-18(b)(3); 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAL LOSS RATIO: GETTING YOUR MONEY’S 
WORTH ON HEALTH INSURANCE (2010), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-
FAQs/medical-loss-ratio.html [https://perma.cc/Z36R-JPAB]. HHS has since recognized the role that 
states play in assisting with enforcement and will accept the findings of a state audit. Id. The MLR 
provision promotes the clear accounting of costs because it requires insurance companies to provide to 
HHS an annual report on how they spent premium revenue. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a); CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra. In the reports, insurance companies have to include the total 
earned premiums, total reimbursement for clinical services, total spending on activities to improve 
quality, and total spending on all other non-claim costs other than federal and state taxes and fees. 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra. Activities that improve quality are those that in-
crease the likelihood of desired health outcomes. Id. Enrollees in each state can access insurance com-
panies’ public reports to see how insurers utilize their premium fees. Id. Specifically, enrollees are 
able to compare how much the insurance company spent on clinical services and improving health 
care versus how much it spent on administrative costs such as executive salaries and bonuses, adver-
tising, and marketing. Id.  
 4 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(ii). In order for an activity to be considered one that improves 
health-care quality, it must be backed by evidence, account for the specific needs of patients, and 
objectively increase desired health outcomes. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 
3. To continue to foster innovation, however, the MLR provision does not require insurance compa-
nies to provide initial evidence to designate an activity as improving health-care quality. Id. If the 
insurance company wants to continue claiming the activity as quality improving, the company must 
objectively show noticeable results from the activity. Id. 
 5 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(B)(i). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has 
estimated that the MLR provision will affect up to 74.8 million Americans, and roughly 9 million 
Americans will be eligible to receive rebates totaling $1.4 billion. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., supra note 3. CMS has also estimated that an individual could receive an average rebate of 
$164 annually. Id. If an insurance company does not comply with the MLR requirements, HHS can 
impose civil monetary penalties. Id. Violations of the MLR provision are subject to a penalty of $100 
per entity, per day, for each individual affected by the violation. Id. 
 6 See Medical Loss Ratio—Overview, UNITEDHEALTHCARE (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.uhc.com/
content/dam/uhcdotcom/en/HealthReform/PDF/Provisions/MedicalLossRatio_Basics.pdf [https://perma.
cc/PPH2-7BSN] (providing the components of the MLR calculation). HHS worked with the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to establish the methodology for calculating the 
MLR. Id. Calculation of the MLR is not based on an individual’s policy, but instead on the aggregate 
performance of a health plan. SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIO REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA): 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1, 16 (2013). 
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quality.7 The denominator consists of the total premium revenue collected 
from policyholders, less taxes, licensing fees, and regulatory fees.8 The main 
point of contention in Morris was whether payments for services by out-of-
network providers should be included as incurred claims in the numerator.9 
The Ninth Circuit held that there was no reason for excluding payments for 
out-of-network services in the MLR calculation and, thus, that the payments 
must be accounted for in the numerator of the MLR.10 
This Comment argues that, in ruling that there is no distinction between 
in-network and out-of-network services for calculating the MLR numerator, 
the Ninth Circuit properly upheld the core values of the ACA.11 Part I dis-
cusses the legal and factual context of Morris.12 Part II describes the argu-
ments against including claim adjustments for out-of-network service as in-
curred claims in the MLR numerator.13 Part III supports the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling that there should be no distinction between in-network and out-of-
network services when calculating the MLR.14 
                                                                                                                           
 7 UNITEDHEALTHCARE, supra note 6. Incurred claims are also known as medical claims, health-
care benefits, or clinical services. KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 6. The amount spent on incurred 
claims includes the direct claims incurred, any unpaid claim reserves associated with the claims in-
curred, claims-related portion of reserves for contingent benefits and lawsuits, and experience-rated 
refunds. Id. In addition, HHS agreed with the NAIC’s recommendation that prescription drug costs 
should be part of the calculation of the incurred claims amount. Id. 
 8 UNITEDHEALTHCARE, supra note 6. Premium revenue is the total of any fee or contribution that 
a policyholder has paid to obtain coverage under the insurance company’s health plan. KIRCHHOFF, 
supra note 6, at 10. Under the MLR provision, there are some exclusions in calculating earned premi-
ums, such as premium assets paid to federal and state high-risk insurance pools, adjustments for retro-
active rate reductions, and reinsurance. Id. Retroactive rate reductions occur when the initial premium 
is merely an estimation but the final premium is based on actual claims made while the policy was in 
place. Id. at 10 n.33. Reinsurance is essentially insurance for insurers where the reinsurers charge a 
premium to the original insurance company for all or part of the losses that the original insurer may 
incur. Id. at 10 n.35. Federal taxes that are subtracted from the denominator are all federal taxes asso-
ciated with health insurance coverage, but taxes on investment income and capital gains are not sub-
tracted from the denominator. Id. at 11. HHS also requires that insurance companies report state taxes 
separately from federal taxes. Id. Licensing and regulatory fees include any statutory assessments and 
examination fees paid in place of premium taxes but do not include regulatory fines and penalties. Id. 
 9 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1018. Medical providers, such as doctors or hospitals, are in-network when 
they accept the enrollee’s health insurance plan. See What’s the Difference Between In Network and Out 
of Network?, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICH., https://www.bcbsm.com/index/health-insurance-
help/faqs/topics/how-health-insurance-works/difference-between-in-network-out-of-network-benefits.
html [https://perma.cc/QK5K-6TFC] (explaining that in-network providers agree to an approved bill-
ing amount, which the insurance company determines, for services provided). If providers do not 
accept an enrollee’s health insurance plan, insurance companies consider them out-of-network provid-
ers. Id. 
 10 See Morris, 918 F.3d at 1020 (stating that there is no indication from either the phrasing or 
purpose of the ACA to narrowly construe the incurred-claims calculation of the MLR). 
 11 See infra notes 79–90 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 15–62 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 63–78 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 79–90 and accompanying text. 
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I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT BEHIND MORRIS 
Section A of this Part provides an overview of the purpose behind the 
ACA and its changes to the insurance market.15 Section B examines the MLR 
provision of the ACA, focusing on how the ratio is calculated.16 Section C 
presents the factual and procedural history of Morris v. California Physi-
cians’ Service.17 
A. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Purpose and Reform 
The ACA addresses the high health care costs, high uninsured popula-
tion, and health disparities in the United States.18 To tackle these issues, the 
ACA requires individuals to obtain health coverage, subsidizes the cost of 
coverage for lower income individuals, requires small employers to offer 
coverage, and expands eligibility for Medicaid.19 
As part of the insurance market reforms, the ACA departed from the tra-
ditional private health insurance marketplace and instead requires each state 
to establish its own American Health Benefit Exchange (exchange).20 Ex-
changes serve as online marketplaces where individuals without employer-
based coverage and small businesses can compare and purchase health insur-
                                                                                                                           
 15 See infra notes 18–23 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 24–34 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 35–62 and accompanying text. 
 18 AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, WHY DO WE NEED THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT? 1–2 (2017) https://
www.apha.org/~/media/files/pdf/topics/aca/why_need_aca_2017.ashx [https://perma.cc/Q4LH-8BR4]. 
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (aiming to provide quality and affordable health care for all Ameri-
cans). In 2014, Medicare consisted of fourteen percent of the federal budget and that percentage con-
tinues to increase as the baby boom generation ages. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, supra, at 1.Prior to the 
enactment of the ACA in 2012, 16.6% of the population under sixty-five lacked medical insurance. Id. 
This is an issue because those that are uninsured are unlikely to seek preventative care or seek care 
immediately when ill. Id. Additionally, they will pay higher costs when they seek care. Id. 
 19 See Frederik Thide, Comment, In Search of Limiting Principles: The Eleventh Circuit Invali-
dates the Individual Mandate in Florida v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 359, 359 (2012), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol53/iss1/9 [https://perma.cc/A8RW-
BEK2] (explaining that the ACA requires citizens to maintain insurance in order to achieve universal 
access to health care); Harrington, supra note 1, at 704. The individual mandate requires most legal 
residents to enroll in health insurance, unless the premium costs exceed 8% of their incomes. Harring-
ton, supra note 1, at 704. The mandate currently still stands, but Congress repealed the federal penalty 
that enforced compliance in 2017. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 
(2017). Families or individuals who live between 133–400% of the federal poverty level are entitled to 
premium credits to reduce the cost of coverage. Harrington, supra note 1, at 704. The ACA requires 
employers with more than fifty employees to offer a health insurance policy to their employees, or 
they will face a penalty. Id. The ACA expands Medicaid eligibility to people with an income up to 
133% of the federal poverty level. Id.  
 20 42 U.S.C. § 10831(b)(1) (2018); see Harrington, supra note 1, at 707 (predicting that the crea-
tion of government-regulated exchanges would transform the current private market).  
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ance plans.21 An exchange simplifies choosing an insurance plan and ensures 
transparency because it identifies qualified insurance plans and rates them 
according to their quality and price.22 Consumers may also apply for premi-
um tax credits and cost-sharing reductions through an exchange.23 
B. The Medical Loss Ratio Provision: Purpose and Calculation 
The MLR provision of the ACA plays an important role in lowering 
health care costs by requiring insurers to provide an accounting of costs and 
by ensuring that enrollees receive value for their premium payments.24 The 
MLR provision requires insurers to submit a report each plan year to the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS).25 The report must detail the 
ratio of the incurred claims and any adjustments to expenses to the total col-
lected premiums.26 Specifically, the numerator of the ratio includes incurred 
claims, and insurance companies may add quality improvement expenses if 
applicable.27 An incurred claim is a direct claim that the insurance company 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See 42 U.S.C. § 10831(b)(1) (explaining that the exchanges would be useful for consumers to 
research and purchase qualified health plans); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (describ-
ing the ACA’s requirement that each state establish a marketplace for individuals and small businesses 
to shop for private insurance plans online). If a state fails to establish an exchange, the Secretary of 
HHS will establish one and operate it instead. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2018).  
 22 See Stephen H. Gorin, The Affordable Care Act: Background and Analysis, 36 HEALTH & SOC. 
WORK 83, 84 (2011) (explaining that the purpose of the exchanges is to enable individuals to obtain 
coverage on an informed basis because they provide the quality and price of a plan’s benefits and 
monitor any premium increases). 
 23 See VANESSA C. FORSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44065, OVERVIEW OF HEALTH IN-
SURANCE EXCHANGES 1 (2018) (explaining that consumers participating in an exchange may be eli-
gible to receive income-based financial assistance). The premium tax credit helps reduce the cost of 
health insurance. Id. Although the credit is generally available to all consumers who cannot access 
public or employment-based coverage meeting specified standards, individuals with lower incomes 
are likely to receive more credit than those with higher incomes. Id. at 5–6. Consumers can also lower 
the cost of coverage by applying for cost-sharing reductions, which lower out-of-pocket expenses by 
either reducing the annual out-of-pocket limit or reducing the percentage of costs the consumer is 
responsible for. Id. at 6. 
 24 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a), (b); see Morris, 918 F.3d at 1013, 1016 (explaining that the MLR 
provision decreases the cost of health care by encouraging the use of premium revenue on health-care 
related expenses rather than on administration and marketing expenses and profit). 
 25 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a), (b). 
 26 Id. § 300gg-18(a). Insurance companies set contract reserves to account for the value of future 
benefit payments, which is subject to change. KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 7. Contract reserves that 
are set aside at the start of an insurance plan are subsequently used to cover claims as the plan ma-
tures. Id. 
 27 UNITEDHEALTHCARE, supra note 6. Incurred claims are payments that the insurance company 
makes for clinical services provided to the enrollees. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a)(1); Explaining Health 
Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), HENRY J KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 29, 2012), 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/explaining-health-care-reform-medical-loss-ratio-mlr/ 
[https://perma.cc/HY7D-PYU8] [hereinafter HENRY J KAISER FAMILY FOUND.]. Quality improve-
ment expenses are activities that improve the quality of health care. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a)(2). There 
are four specific requirements for an activity to qualify as a quality improvement expenditure. KIRCH-
382 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
pays on behalf of an enrollee for clinical services or supplies that the health 
insurance plan covers.28 The denominator includes earned premiums less any 
taxes, licensing fees, and regulatory fees.29 The MLR provision requires in-
surance companies to disclose the percentage of premium revenue spent on 
medical benefits, heath care quality improvement, and other administrative 
expenses or profits.30 In reporting incurred claims, the statute does not ex-
pressly differentiate between out-of-network and in-network services.31 
The MLR provision requires that insurance companies issue a rebate to 
their policy holders if their numerator is less than eighty-percent of the de-
                                                                                                                           
HOFF, supra note 6, at 7–8. First, the activity must show improvements in patients’ health outcomes. 
Id. at 7. Activities that improve health outcomes can include increasing quality reporting, efficient 
case management, quality care coordination, and continuing management of chronic diseases. Id. 
Second, the activity must reduce hospital readmissions through methods like patient education, dis-
charge planning, and post-discharge follow-ups. Id. Third, the activity must increase patient safety and 
decrease medical errors Id. at 8. This can be achieved through enforcement of best clinical practices, 
evidence-based medicine, and health information technology. Id. Lastly, the activity must encourage 
patient wellness and promote general health. Id. 
 28 45 C.F.R. § 158.140(a) (2019). Generally, an increase in incurred claims and quality improve-
ment expenses will increase the MLR. KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 6. When the MLR increases, the 
likelihood that enrollees receive rebates is lower, because insurance companies are more likely to 
reach the eighty-percent threshold. Id. Although enrollees are less likely to receive a rebate when there 
is an increase in incurred claims and quality improvement expenses, the primary goals of the ACA are 
likely still met because more of the insurance company’s premiums go towards reimbursing clinical 
services and activities that improve the quality of health care. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., supra note 3 (describing how the MLR requirement incentivizes insurers to focus premium 
dollars on reimbursing medical claims). If there are reductions in the amount spent for incurred claims 
or improvement of health care quality, the MLR will decrease. KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 6. A 
decrease in the MLR results in an increased chance that the insurance company will have to provide 
enrollees a rebate. Id. 
 29 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a)(3). Premiums are the revenue earned from consumers purchasing the 
insurance plan. HENRY J KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 27. Federal, state, and local taxes are 
subtracted, but taxes on investment income and capital gains are not. Id. Typically, if the numerator 
stays constant, an increase in earned premiums lowers the MLR. KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 10. 
Conversely, a decrease in earned revenue, while expenses stay constant, will raise the MLR. Id. In-
creasing the MLR decreases the likelihood that an insurance company will have to provide enrollees a 
rebate, because the insurance company is more likely to spend eighty-percent of its revenue on clinical 
services and quality improvement expenses. Id. 
 30 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a); see KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 1. (explaining that the basic func-
tion of the MLR is to measure the share an insurance company spends on medical benefits as opposed 
to other company expenses). Although there are state laws that expand on the MLR provision, the 
ACA’s provision is the minimum standard that certain health insurers nationwide must meet. KIRCH-
HOFF, supra note 6, at 1. For-profit, fully funded health insurers offering coverage must comply with 
the MLR requirements. Id. at 3–4. Non-profit insurers must also report their MLR and meet the re-
quirements to maintain non-profit status. Id. at 4. There are different standards for Medicare Part D 
prescription drug plans and Medicare Advantage Plans. Id. Also, the MLR provision does not apply to 
any health care plans that are self-funded, meaning that the employers assume the risk for medical 
care. Id. 
 31 45 C.F.R. § 158.140(a), (b); Morris, 918 F.3d at 1016.  
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nominator.32 If insurers do not meet the eighty-percent benchmark, they must 
refund the difference between the amount spent and that benchmark to their 
enrollees.33 The rebate furthers the goals behind the ACA as it ensures that 
enrollees receive value for their premium payments and helps lower the cost 
of coverage.34 
C. Morris’s Factual and Procedural History 
As part of its implementation of the ACA’s requirements, the State of 
California selected Blue Shield to be one of the insurance providers on its 
new health insurance exchange, Covered California.35 Consumers who pur-
                                                                                                                           
 32 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A); Morris, 918 F.3d at 1013. For large-group insurance plans, the 
MLR benchmark is 85%, as opposed to 80% for individual and small-group plans. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
18(b)(1)(A)(i); (b)(1)(A)(ii). The ACA considers three different markets: the large-group market, 
small-group market, and individual market. KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 3. The large-group market is 
for employers’ group policies when there are more than one-hundred workers. Id. The small-group 
market sells policies for employers with up to one-hundred employees. Id. For employer-sponsored 
insurance, whether large or small, the employer receives the rebate and apportions it to the employees 
based on their portion of the premium payment. Id. at 16. For individual insurance, the insurer will 
directly pay the rebate to the enrollee. Id. If a policy, individual or employer-based, only covers an 
enrollee for a part of the calendar year, the rebate is prorated accordingly. Id. 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(B); Morris, 918 F.3d at 1013. If a provider fails to meet the eighty-
percent requirement, it must notify its policyholders of the rebate. HENRY J KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
supra note 27. Insurance companies must issue any rebates by August first using the MLR calculated 
for the previous calendar year. KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 16. HHS has defined an enrollee to in-
clude any person or entity that has paid a premium to receive health-care coverage during the relevant 
calendar year. Id. 
 34 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b); see MARK A. HALL & MICHAEL J. MCCUE, HOW THE ACA’S MEDI-
CAL LOSS RATIO RULE PROTECTS CONSUMERS AND INSURERS AGAINST ONGOING CERTAINTY 2 
(2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/jul/how-aca-medical-loss-
ratio-rule-protects-consumers-insurers [https://perma.cc/LV6B-LS2G] (explaining that the MLR re-
bate prevents excessive profits for insurance companies and protects consumers against overpriced 
health-care plans  
 35 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1016. California established Covered California after the passage of the 
ACA and officially began enrollment on October 1, 2013 for the first open-enrollment period. Richard 
M. Scheffler et al., Covered California: The Impact of Provider and Health Plan Market Power on 
Premiums, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y L. 1179, 1180 (2015). Covered California offered eleven health 
plans in 2014, including Blue Shield of California, Anthem Blue Cross of California, Health Net, and 
Kaiser Permanente. Id. These four insurers composed of ninety-three percent of the statewide market 
share in Covered California during its first policy year. Id. Consumers could enroll in the health plan 
of their choice through Covered California. Id. Most insurers offered an array of policies, including 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), or exclusive 
provider organizations (EPOs). Id. Blue Shield offered PPO and EPO individual and family (IPF) 
plans. Brief for Appellee at 10, Morris, 918 F.3d 1011 (No. 2:16-cv-05914-JAK), 2018 WL 734016, 
at *10. If an enrollee purchases a PPO plan, the enrollee pays less for providers within the plan’s net-
work. Id. If the enrollee uses a provider outside the network, the enrollee will incur additional costs. 
Id. In an EPO, there is a single network and out-of-network services are not covered at all, unless it is 
emergency or plan-approved care. Id. at 11. 
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chased insurance plans with Blue Shield could search for in-network health 
care providers in an online directory.36 
Issues arose when Blue Shield enrollees found out that some providers 
listed as in-network providers in the directory did not accept their insur-
ance.37 In late 2013, enrollees filed a complaint with the California Depart-
ment of Managed Health Care (DMHC).38 DMHC conducted a formal survey 
of Blue Shield’s entire provider directory and found that approximately nine 
percent of the physicians listed as in-network providers in the online directo-
ry were not in-network.39 
Due to this error, a portion of Blue Shield’s enrollees received clinical 
services from providers that were out-of-network, erroneously thinking they 
were in-network providers.40 Because the providers were out-of-network, the 
enrollees were responsible for paying more out of pocket for their medical 
care.41 
To resolve the issue, Blue Shield entered into a settlement agreement 
with DMHC.42 Blue Shield agreed to reprocess claims and compensate enrol-
lees who paid out-of-network rates for providers that Blue Shield mistakenly 
listed as in-network.43 Blue Shield ultimately paid $38 million in claims ad-
                                                                                                                           
 36 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1016. Blue Shield enrollees could also call customer service representa-
tives to find in-network providers and acquire their information. Id. The customer service representa-
tives help the insured to select from Blue Shield’s directory a physician that participated as an in-
network provider and to identify physicians considered out-of-network providers. Id. 
 37 Id. at 1016–17. 
 38 Id. at 1016. The California Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC) is the governing 
body that regulates California’s health-care plans. Id. DMHC is charged with protecting consumers’ 
health-care rights and maintaining proper functioning of the health-care delivery system. About the 
DMHC, DEP’T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, https://www.dmhc.ca.govAbouttheDMHC.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/UVK6-6Y5M]. In response to the enrollees’ complaint, DMHC conducted an infor-
mal survey of randomly selected providers listed as in-network in the Blue Shield directory. Morris, 
918 F.3d at 1016. It found that many provider offices did not accept Covered California despite being 
listed as an approved provider on Blue Shield’s directory. Id. at 1017. 
 39 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1017. DMHC began a formal survey of Blue Shield’s entire directory after 
finding, through the informal survey, that several of the listed providers did not accept Covered Cali-
fornia. Id. at 1016. Because of Blue Shield’s mistake, some enrollees had to pay more out of pocket 
for the medical services they received than they would usually pay if the provider was in-network. 
Morris v. Blue Shield of Cal. (Blue Shield), No. 16-05914, 2017 WL 1653938, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 
1, 2017), aff’d 918 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 40 Brief for Appellee, supra note 35, at 11–12. Under either Blue Shield’s PPO or EPO plan, 
enrollees would not incur any bill, or would incur only a smaller bill, if they obtained medical care 
from an in-network provider. Id. at 10–11. 
 41 Brief for Appellee, supra note 35, at 11–12. 
 42 Id. at 12. 
 43 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1017. Blue Shield recognized that it had mistakenly listed out-of-network 
providers as in-network, resulting in confusion and increased out-of-pocket expenses for enrollees. Id. 
Under Exhibit A of the settlement agreement, enrollees qualified for reprocess payments if, during the 
2014 and 2015 benefit years, they paid more for services than they would have if the claims were 
properly processed as services provided by in-network providers. Id. To be eligible for reimburse-
ment, Blue Shield required enrollees to prove they received the covered services, identify the specific 
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justments and included this amount in the MLR numerator, but it still fell 
below the eighty-percent benchmark.44 As a result, Blue Shield paid an annu-
al rebate to its enrollees.45 Although the plaintiffs, Becky Ebenkamp and Re-
becca Morris on behalf of over 446,000 enrollees, received an MLR rebate 
from Blue Shield, they claimed that they should have received a larger rebate 
because Blue Shield improperly included the claim adjustments from the set-
tlement agreement as part of the incurred-claims numerator of the MLR.46 
The plaintiffs originally brought a putative class action suit in Los An-
geles County Superior Court.47 They alleged that, by treating the settlement 
payments as part of Blue Shield’s incurred claims, Blue Shield violated state 
law prohibiting unfair competition and unjust enrichment.48 More specifical-
ly, the plaintiffs alleged that Blue Shield’s conduct violated California’s Un-
fair Competition Law because it constituted an unlawful business act, unfair 
business act, and fraudulent business act.49 The plaintiffs further alleged that 
Blue Shield was unjustly enriched at the plaintiffs’ expense by retaining the 
                                                                                                                           
services they received, list the date of their visit, and confirm that either they paid the provider or the 
provider was actively seeking payment. Id. 
 44 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1017; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(ii) (stipulating the calculation for 
the rebate amount). 
 45 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1017. 
 46 Id. Blue Shield gave Morris an MLR rebate of $118.72 and Ebenkamp a rebate of $174.94. 
Blue Shield, 2017 WL 1653938, at *6. The plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of all enrollees in 
similar situations in the amount of $34,941,646, which is the difference between the rebates that Blue 
Shield paid and those that it would have paid if it had not included the settlement payments. Id. 
 47 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1017. The plaintiffs based allegations of miscalculation on a memorandum 
that Blue Shield released in 2016 stating that it paid $44,596,201 in claims for payment errors in 2014. 
Blue Shield, 2017 WL 1653938, at *2. Blue Shield confirmed that the payment error amount included 
the settlement payments. Id. A class action lawsuit is usually brought by one or more named plaintiffs 
on behalf of a group of individuals, known as the class, who are similarly situated. Margaret M. 
Zwisler et al., Overview of Class/Collective Actions and Current Trends, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP 
403, 405 (2015), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/TheClassActionsGuide-US [https://perma.cc/
9ZZ9-J5PC]. A putative class action is a proposed class action because a court has not officially certi-
fied the class. Id. at 407. Once a court determines that the potential class, also referred as the putative 
class, has satisfied the requirements for a class action in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), a puta-
tive class action becomes a class action. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Zwisler, supra at 408. 
 48 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1017–18; see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2020) (defining unfair 
competition).  
 49 Class Action Complaint for Damages, Declaratory and Injunctive Reliefat 12–15, Morris, 918 
F.3d 1011 (No. 2:16-cv-05914-JAK-JPR), 2017 WL 1653938, at *7. Plaintiffs claimed that Blue 
Shield acted unlawfully because it wrongly inflated its MLR, which resulted in it paying a lower re-
bate to the enrollees. Id. at 12. The plaintiffs claimed that Blue Shield engaged in an unfair business 
act because it included the restitution payments in its MLR in bad faith, made material and misleading 
omissions in how it calculated its MLR, and calculated the MLR in a manner that was not transparent 
or verifiable by the plaintiffs. Id. at 13. Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that Blue Shield engaged in 
a fraudulent business act because, by including the restitution payments the MLR, Blue Shield acted 
in a false and misleading manner to deceive the plaintiffs. Id. at 14. Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that 
including the restitution payments violated the MLR provision because the ACA requires insurers to 
exclude erroneous claims payments from its calculation. Id. at 12. 
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difference between the rebate paid and the rebate amount that the plaintiffs 
believed they should have received.50 Blue Shield subsequently removed the 
suit to the District Court for the Central District of California and sought 
dismissal of the complaint.51 
The plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) arguing that the 
settlement payments were restitution for payments for out-of-network ser-
vices, not claims paid to in-network providers.52 Thus, the plaintiffs alleged 
that the settlement payments should not be included in the MLR’s incurred-
claims numerator.53 Blue Shield filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, arguing 
that the settlement payments counted as incurred claims because they were 
for services that the insurance policies covered.54 In response, the plaintiffs 
contended that, because the providers were out-of-network, the insurance 
policies did not cover the services.55 
After reviewing the settlement agreement, MLR statute, and regulations, 
the district court granted Blue Shield’s motion to dismiss without leave to 
amend, reasoning that the payments were compensation for clinical services, 
regardless of whether the services were out-of-network.56 The district court 
further reasoned that the plaintiffs’ position was inconsistent with the defini-
tion of “incurred claims” as stated in the ACA.57 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Class Action Complaint for Damages, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 49, at 15. 
 51 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1018; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018) (allowing for the removal of a suit to 
a federal district court with original jurisdiction). 
 52 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1018. A first amended complaint alters the original complaint. Amended 
Complaint, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
claim adjustments should have been included on Line 2.6 of Part 1 of the MLR Report rather than 
calculated as part of incurred claims because they were payment errors. Blue Shield, 2017 WL 
1653938, at *2. Line 2.6 is for “any amount excluded from claims for MLR purposes that are normal-
ly included in claims for financial statement purposes.” Id. 
 53 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1018. 
 54 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing a defendant to move to dismiss a case). 
 55 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1018. According to the plaintiffs, only reimbursements for services by in-
network providers should be considered in the MLR numerator. Id. at 1014. 
 56 See Blue Shield, 2017 WL 1653938, at *8 (reasoning that the restitution payments compensated 
the insureds for clinical services, and thus Blue Shield was correct to include those payments as part 
of the incurred-claims numerator of the MLR). 
 57 Id. at *6. The plaintiffs argued that the restitution payments were not required under the terms 
of the insurance policy. Id. Therefore, they claimed that the only payments that should have been 
included under the policy were reimbursements for claims at the out-of-network rate. Id. The district 
court noted that there was no provision that prohibits treating the restitution payments as incurred 
claims, even if they were above the amount required under MLR policies. Id. The court also looked to 
the ACA’s definition of “incurred claims,” which allows insurers to include the amount they spent on 
reimbursements for clinical services that were provided to enrollees. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a) 
(stating the requirement for insurers to include reimbursements for clinical services under the numera-
tor of the MLR). The court determined that services provided out-of-network fall within the ACA’s 
definition of incurred claims. Blue Shield, 2017 WL 1653938, at *6; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a). 
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The plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision.58 The Ninth Circuit held that the spirit and intent behind the 
ACA did not permit a narrow reading of the MLR provision to exclude pay-
ments for out-of-network services.59 The court noted that Congress intended 
the ACA to expand health care benefits while reducing costs.60 The court also 
emphasized the important role that the MLR provision plays in the ACA’s 
goals of expanding health care coverage and decreasing health care costs.61 
As such, the Ninth Circuit determined that, in order to discourage disputes 
and focus on lowering health care costs, all benefit payments, whether in-
network or out-of-network, should be included in the MLR numerator.62 
II. THE PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCLUDING  
SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS IN THE MLR NUMERATOR 
The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument was that Blue Shield should not 
have included the payments for services that the insurance plan did not cover 
when calculating the MLR numerator.63 First, the plaintiffs pointed to the 
statute that provides the types of expenditures that may be included in the 
numerator.64 They emphasized that the language requiring insurance compa-
nies to report the amount they spent on incurred claims provided to enrollees 
“under such coverage” supported their argument that payments for clinical 
services must comply with the terms of the health insurance policy.65 Be-
cause the health insurance policy did not cover the reimbursed out-of-
                                                                                                                           
 58 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1014, 1018. 
 59 Id. at 1019–20 (holding it unnecessary to strain the language of the MLR provision because the 
purpose of the ACA was to broaden access to health care and reduce costs). 
 60 Id. at 1020 (explaining that the MLR provision incentivizes insurers to spend more on clinical 
services, which, in return, aids the expansion of health care coverage). The court also noted that the 
MLR provision helps to reduce health care costs because if an insurance company fails to reach the 
eighty percent requirement, policyholders are reimbursed the difference. Id. 
 61 See id. (reasoning that the MLR rebate lowers health care costs by reimbursing enrollees a 
portion of the premiums paid). The eighty-percent benchmark incentivizes insurance companies to 
maximize the amount spent on clinical services and activities that improve health care quality. Id. 
 62 Id. (explaining that Congress’s emphasis on expanding coverage and benefits and reducing 
costs discourages insurance companies from spending premium revenue on administrative costs, such 
as those that come with disputes). 
 63 See Opening Brief for Appellant at 19, Morris v. Cal. Physicians’ Serv., 918 F.3d 1011 (9th 
Cir. 2019) (No. 2:16-cv-05914-JAK-JPR), 2017 WL 5957481, at *xxii (arguing that the statute and 
regulations clearly show that insurers cannot include services not covered when calculating the nu-
merator of the MLR). 
 64 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a)(1) (2018) (providing that “reimbursement for clinical services provid-
ed to enrollees under such coverage” are included in the MLR numerator); Morris, 918 F.3d at 1018. 
 65 See Reply Brief for Appellant at 1, Morris, 918 F.3d 1011 (No. 2:16-cv-05914-JAK), 2018 WL 
1093773, at *1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a)) (arguing that there should be a distinction between 
in-network and out-of-network payments because the plain meaning of the statute indicates that pay-
ments for clinical services must be made to policyholders based on the terms of the policy). 
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network expenses, the plaintiffs contended that they should have been ex-
cluded from the MLR numerator.66 Second, in the regulations that specify 
what qualifies as an incurred claim, the plaintiffs argued that the meaning of 
“covered by the policy” only includes in-network services and providers.67 
Therefore, the plaintiffs maintained that the statutory and regulatory text in-
dicates that insurers may only include in the MLR numerator services that 
the insurance policy covers, in-network services, not all clinical services 
provided to an enrollee.68 
The plaintiffs also contended that under the current insurance system, 
whether a service is covered by the policy depends on if it is a covered bene-
fit under the terms of the policy and the identity of the provider of the ser-
vice.69 Therefore, the plaintiffs argued that if there was no differentiation be-
tween in-network and out-of-network payments, insurers would be more 
likely to make payments outside the terms of the health insurance policy.70 
Similar to how Blue Shield passed the burden of the settlement payments 
onto its policyholders by lowering the rebate amount, future insurers could 
pass these costs onto its policyholders.71 The plaintiffs argued that this runs 
contrary to the MLR provision’s intent to reduce health care costs and pro-
mote efficiency because it could increase health care costs for enrollees.72 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 65, at 2 (arguing that the “under such coverage” 
language only allows reimbursements outlined in the policy’s terms). 
 67 45 C.F.R. § 158.140(a) (2019) (providing that incurred claims include payments to providers 
“whose services are covered by the policy”); see Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 65, at 4 (citing 
45 C.F.R. § 158.140(a)) (contending that incurred claims exclude payments made for out-of-network 
services because the policy did not cover them).  
 68 See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 63, at 19 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a)(1)) (em-
phasizing that the reimbursement for clinical services is only provided if the service is “under such 
coverage”). 
 69 See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 63, at 20 (citing Peter Kempter et al., Insurance 
Product Design and Its Effects: Trade-Offs Along the Managed Care Continuum, 30 INQUIRY 101, 
102 (2012)). The plaintiffs also highlighted the difference between plan structures and provision and 
how they affect whether a plan includes a service. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 63, at 20. 
For example, EPOs only cover services provided in-network and do not cover any out-of-network 
services. Id. at 21. In contrast, coverage provided by PPOs may vary. Id. For example, some PPOs 
may provide certain out-of-network benefits while limiting other services, and others cover out-of-
network services on an indemnity basis. Id. 
 70 See Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 65, at 3 (explaining how encouraging health care 
expenditures could incentivize insurers to spend premium revenue on services outside the policy’s 
terms because insurers can pass all those costs onto its policyholders). 
 71 See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 63, at 22 (arguing that if insurers could include 
more than just covered services as part of incurred claims in the MLR numerator, there would be no 
deterrence for future insurance companies to do the same and charge policyholders for the cost). 
 72 See Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 65, at 3 (explaining how passing costs onto policy-
holders increases health care costs beyond the limit set forth in the policy). 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments based on the court’s 
analysis of the statutory and regulatory language.73 The court reasoned that 
the statutory language, “under such coverage,” focuses on insurance compa-
nies providing coverage for health services and only measures total expendi-
tures on clinical services.74 Therefore, the court determined that there was no 
reason to differentiate between the amount spent on in-network and out-of-
network services.75 Furthermore, the court determined that the regulatory 
language “covered by the policy” does not indicate that the provider must be 
in-network for the expenses to be part of the MLR numerator.76 Rather, the 
court reasoned that the regulation, like the statute, does not distinguish be-
tween in-network and out-of-network providers or services.77 Finally, the 
court determined that whether a service is covered by the policy is deter-
mined by the type of service, not any characteristic of the provider.78 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROMOTED THE INTENTION  
BEHIND THE ACA AND MLR PROVISION 
The Ninth Circuit properly used Morris v. California Physicians’ Ser-
vice as an opportunity to promote the ACA’s intention of decreasing health 
care costs and increasing efficiency in the health care system.79 First, if the 
Ninth Circuit determined that there was a notable difference between in-
network and out-of-network services, it would decrease efficiency in the 
health care system.80 Drawing such a distinction would incentivize insurance 
companies to spend more time and resources determining if a reimbursement 
for clinical services could be included in the MLR calculation.81 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Morris, 918 F.3d at 1019 (stating that none of the relevant federal laws supported the plain-
tiffs’ argument that the settlement payments must be excluded from the MLR numerator). 
 74 Id. at 1018–19;  see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a)(1).  
 75 See Morris, 918 F.3d at 1018–19 (stating that only the total expenditure was relevant, because 
that is the critical focus of the MLR provision, not the relative amounts paid to in-network or out-of-
network providers). In response to the plaintiffs’ argument that clinical services must be within the 
policy’s coverage, the court determined that the limitation is on the types of services that qualify and 
not the qualification of the health care provider. Id. at 1019. 
 76 Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 158.140(a). 
 77 Morris, 918 F.3d at 1019. 
 78 See id. (reasoning that the nature of the services determines whether the service qualifies as 
“under such coverage,” and not any qualification of the provider); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
18(a)(1). 
 79 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012); see Morris v. Cal. 
Physicians’ Serv., 918 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the MLR requirement and 
rebate together incentivize insurers to spend more of the premium revenue on health care and activi-
ties that improve the quality of health care). 
 80 See Morris, 918 F.3d at 1020 (noting that the distinction would discourage payment of benefits 
even though the MLR is intended to expand health care benefits). 
 81 See id. (reasoning that drawing such a distinction would encourage disputes that may be costly 
for the insurance company). To dispute a claim, an enrollee could contact the billing department of the 
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Second, whether a service is considered in-network or out-of-network 
would increasingly become a source of contention between enrollees and 
insurance providers.82 With more of the premium revenue spent on resolving 
these disputes, insurance companies would use a lower percentage of the 
premium revenue for clinical services or improving the quality of health 
care.83 For example, if another insurance company were to face a similar is-
sue as Blue Shield, it is possible that it would face a similar dispute with pol-
icyholders.84 Therefore, insurance companies would focus more resources on 
administrative expenses rather than clinical services.85 
Lastly, if the Ninth Circuit ruled differently, it would run contrary to the 
ACA’s purpose and suggest that the intention of the MLR provision is to 
provide rebates to policyholders.86 Rather, the purposes of the provision are 
to promote transparency through clear accounting for costs and ensure con-
sumer value.87 Policyholders only receive a rebate when an insurance com-
                                                                                                                           
insurance company either through phone or writing. Health Care: Resolving Billing Problems and 
Claim Denials, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, https://www.upheld.org/pubs/health-care-resolving-billing-
problems-and-claim-denials [https://perma.cc/Q873-8C3P]. If the insurance company is unable to 
resolve the dispute, the enrollee can then file a formal review with the company that would require the 
insurer to conduct an internal review. Id. Additionally, if the internal review does not satisfy the enrol-
lee, the enrollee can contact the state regulatory agency which would require the insurance company’s 
information and participation. Id. 
 82 See Morris, 918 F.3d at 1020 (explaining that excluding payments for services provided out-of-
network would encourage disputes similar to the case at hand). Insurance companies can provide 
discounted rates for in-network services because they negotiate with the providers. James P. Jacobson, 
To Pay or Not to Pay, That Is the Question: Coverage Disputes Between Health Plans and Members, 
29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 445, 449 (2008). In special circumstances, a health insurance policy 
may approve in-network coverage for out-for-network providers if the insurance company determines 
that the in-network providers cannot properly treat the enrollee because of medical needs or a special 
condition. Id. at 449–50. 
 83 See Jean M. Abraham et al., How Has the Affordable Care Act’s Medical Loss Ratio Regula-
tion Affected Insurer Behavior?, 52 MED. CARE 370, 371 (2014) (noting that an insurer can raise the 
MLR by decreasing administrative expenses and allowing more spending reimbursements for claims). 
In 2018, Blue Shield earned $20.6 billion in revenue from premiums and spent $2.3 billion on admin-
istrative costs. Financials, BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA, https://bit.ly/35damUy [https://perma.cc/
2QG4-G4RY]. Excluding marketing and taxes, Blue Shield spent $1.6 billion on general and adminis-
trative expenses. Id.  
 84 See Morris, 918 F.3d at 1020 (noting that ruling in favor of the plaintiffs would encourage 
disputes similar to those in this case). 
 85 See id. (explaining that affirming a distinction between payment for in-network and out-of-
network services would not only limit the payments made for clinical services but also increase the 
costly disputes, and that the MLR provision expressly discourages the use of premium revenue for 
administrative costs). After the passage of the MLR provision, the individual market, small group 
market, and large group market reported lower total and per member administrative costs nationally 
from 2010 to 2011. Abraham et al., supra note 83, at 371. 
 86 NFIB, 567 U.S. at 538; Morris, 918 F.3d at 1020. The Obama Administration implemented the 
ACA to address high health care costs and the high population of uninsured. AM. PUB. HEALTH 
ASS’N, supra note 18, at 1. 
 87 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a), (b) (2018); see Scott E. Harrington, Medical Loss Ratio Regulation 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 50 INQUIRY 9, 10 (2013) (summarizing the stated goals of the ACA’s 
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pany fails to spend eighty percent of its premium revenue on clinical ser-
vices.88 The rebate is a secondary measure because individuals who enroll in 
health insurance plans expect their insurance to cover health care costs, not 
to provide rebates.89 Therefore, it would have been improper for the Ninth 
Circuit to suggest that the purpose behind the MLR provision was to provide 
rebates instead of insurance benefits.90 
CONCLUSION 
Congress passed the ACA with two main goals: expanding health insur-
ance coverage and reducing heath care costs. The MLR provision furthers the 
goals of the ACA by requiring insurance companies to spend at least eighty-
percent of their revenue towards clinical services and health care quality im-
provement. The numerator of the MLR is calculated by the adding the 
amount the insurance company spent on incurred claims and the amount it 
spent on quality improvement activities. The denominator is the total revenue 
collected by the insurance company less taxes, licensing fees, and regulatory 
fees. 
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal circuit court of appeals to rule on 
whether there is a distinction between in-network and out-of-network ser-
vices when calculating the incurred claims portion of the MLR. Based on 
statutes and regulations addressing the calculation of the MLR, the court held 
that out-of-network services may be included in the numerator of the MLR as 
part the insurance company’s incurred claims. The Ninth Circuit noted that 
there was no indication in the ACA, whether in the writing or in the purpose 
of the ACA itself, to narrowly interpret the MLR provision. 
                                                                                                                           
MLR provision). Policyholders pay premiums every month to receive reimbursements from the insur-
ance company or so that the insurance company pays directly for clinical services and other health 
care costs. See Health Insurance, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/health-
insurance/ [https://perma.cc/QB6F-F2KM] (defining “health insurance”); Premium, HEALTHCARE.
GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/premium/ [https://perma.cc/93TR-PLGR] (defining “pre-
mium”). 
 88 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a); KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 2. HHS announced that in 2012, insur-
ance companies issued $504 million in rebates, compared to the $1.1 billion they issued in 2011. 
KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 2. 
 89 See AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 18, at 1–2. Specifically, health insurance provides 
financial protection for unexpected or serious injuries or illnesses and covers the costs of preventative 
services like vaccinations and screening tests. Id. Generally, the higher the MLR, the more value the 
consumer receives with their premium payments. See KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 1. If a consumer 
receives a rebate because the insurance company failed to meet the benchmark, then the consumer 
receives less value for each dollar of paid premium. Id. 
 90 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a), (b); Morris, 918 F.3d at 1020; KIRCHHOFF, supra note 6, at 1 
(explaining that health insurance is supposed to provide protection against financial risks that come 
with illness or injury). 
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The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is consistent with the purpose behind the 
ACA. In order to expand health care coverage and lower health care costs, 
the MLR provision should be read broadly and without a distinction between 
in-network and out-of-network services. The Ninth Circuit’s broad interpre-
tation discourages further disputes and refocuses the spending of premium 
revenue on clinical services and on improving the quality of the health care 
system. 
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